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Introduction  
In ‘When God Commands Disobedience’ (Clayton and Stevens 2014) we address 
the question of how Rawlsian political liberals should treat the religiously 
unreasonable. The religiously unreasonable are those who, for reasons of 
religious faith or perceived divine command, reject one or more of the 
fundamental principles of society as a cooperative enterprise between free and 
equal people, and who may seek to change (or even punish) the political 
community in line with their comprehensive religious beliefs. We argue, first, 
that political liberals have weighty reasons to engage with the unreasonable. 
However, second, following Hobbes (1651) in observing that divine law trumps 
law enacted by humans, we argue that the response to those who claim to have 
theistic reasons for acts that are unreasonable by liberal standards must be a 
theological one: political liberals must be prepared to offer a direct religious 
response. They must offer reasons aimed at establishing that the unreasonable 
are mistaken about the political implications of their religious doctrine or about 
the soundness of the particular religious doctrine they affirm. We then further 
elaborate the nature of the proper religious response by defending a division of 
justificatory labour with respect to who should engage the religiously 
unreasonable on such matters. We argue that politicians and political 
philosophers are not best placed to offer religious arguments. The danger would 
be that politicians and political philosophers risk, on the one hand, appearing 
sectarian if they commit publicly to a particular religious view, thus risking 
alienating other, reasonable, citizens of faith, or (on the other hand) they risk 
appearing disingenuous by offering conditional responses about what others 
should believe about their faith (but which they themselves do not in fact 
believe). Instead, we argue that the task of offering religious reasons would best 
be delegated to citizens themselves, particularly those reasonable citizens who 
share the same broad faith as those whom we hope to convince. Such reasonable 
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citizens are not subject to the same worries over alienation and 
disingenuousness, or at least not to the same degree.  
 In his reply, Baldwin Wong (2018) takes issue with our view of the 
division of justificatory labour. Whilst Wong agrees with our argument for the 
need for a religious response to the religiously unreasonable, he disagrees that 
the division of labour we propose is warranted. He argues that we are too 
pessimistic in thinking that politicians and political philosophers are incapable of 
conditional or conjectural reasoning in the same way as reasonable religious 
citizens. Wong contends that an appropriately framed form of argument from 
conjecture – one that is sincere in the sense of being both honest in its intentions 
and open-minded – can escape the dilemma of alienation and disingenuousness.  
 We are grateful to Wong for his challenge to our argument for a division 
of justificatory labour. We will take the opportunity to set out in a little more 
detail our conception of how political liberals ought to engage with politically 
unreasonable religious individuals, and in doing so, offer our response to his 
criticisms. 
 
 
Belief Formation and Persuasion  
We begin with some clarifications regarding the moral principles regulating 
belief-formation, as well as the various strategies for persuasion. The purpose of 
engagement with politically unreasonable religious individuals (hereafter, the 
unreasonable) is to persuade them to change their beliefs such that their 
comprehensive religious convictions become consistent with liberal political 
principles. There are at least two weighty reasons to take steps to encourage the 
unreasonable to change their beliefs. First, it is valuable for our fellow citizens to 
come to see the worth of living in a society regulated by liberal principles 
because it makes their lives as citizens go better. Evangelizing on behalf of liberal 
society might, therefore, be done out of a concern for our fellow citizens for their 
own sake (Rawls 1996; Dworkin 2011, Ch. 9). Second, liberal principles require 
us to prevent social disruption or harm to others and one way of effecting that is 
by persuading unreasonable citizens of the benefits of living in a stable and 
flourishing liberal democracy.  
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 Persuading individuals to bring their comprehensive convictions into line 
with liberal principles is generally preferable to other forms of belief formation 
or manipulation of people’s behaviour. Of course, it is possible to alter the 
payoffs of the various options available to someone (either by threats or 
incentives) such that, given her beliefs, she is led to behave differently; it is 
possible to ‘nudge’ people towards the right views or conduct by altering certain 
features of the choice architecture to shape their beliefs or behavior; it may even 
become possible to change beliefs via direct neuro-interventions into the brain 
(Clayton & Moles forthcoming). However, other things equal, persuasion is 
generally preferable to these other kinds of intervention because it leaves the 
individual free to come to see for herself that there are weighty reasons to 
endorse and live by liberal values. (Of course, if persuasion is ineffective, other 
techniques of belief-formation and conduct-regulation, such as nudging or 
neurointerventions might be explored.) 
 Suppose, then, that liberal societies are duty-bound to seek to convert the 
unreasonable to reasonable views by persuasion. It is important to explore how 
the burdens of persuasion ought to be distributed. It might be thought that all 
reasonable persons share in this burden equally, given their participation in, and 
the benefits they receive from, the liberal political community. However, even if 
the moral requirement is, in principle, universal in this way, we might think the 
duty better discharged by some specific person or persons on behalf of the 
political community (perhaps with compensation from others for costs 
incurred). Such persons might include politicians and public officials, those with 
particular expertise in religious and moral knowledge, or reasonable citizens of 
faith. Given that many, if not most people, will lack sufficient specialist 
knowledge to engage in the task of such persuasion, some form of division of 
labour seems most beneficial. 
 If a division of justificatory labour is justifiable, then it is a further 
question which actors or group of actors are best suited to act as liberal 
persuaders. This, in turn, will dictate what kinds of persuasion or arguments will 
be optimal. Here we might conceive of the possibilities as falling into two broad 
camps: those external to the particular religious tradition or doctrine held by 
those whom we are attempting to persuade; those internal to that tradition, in 
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that they share some (or all) of the basic premises of the faith held by those 
whom we seek to persuade.1 For example, in an attempt to persuade, say, 
adherents of a version of Christianity who reject one or more of the fundamental 
principles of liberal political morality that their interpretation of the faith is 
mistaken, internal persuaders would include, predominantly, other Christian 
citizens who share similar presuppositions or articles of faith. External 
persuaders, by contrast, would lack this shared set of presuppositions or beliefs, 
and reasoning would, as we argue in our earlier piece, likely take place on a 
conditional or conjectural basis. Those who may undertake this task externally 
would include politicians and public officials, political philosophers, and citizens 
of other (and no) faiths. 
 As an example of such an internal reformatory interpretation of a 
religious doctrine aimed at participating in an overlapping consensus on a liberal 
constitutional regime, Rawls cites the work of Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im 
(1990). We discuss this example from Rawls in our original article. As Rawls 
writes, for An-Na’im’s ‘interpretation to be accepted by Muslims, it must be 
presented as the correct and superior interpretation of Shari’a.’ (Rawls 1999, 
590 n.46). An-Na’im begins his attempt at liberal persuasion from an acceptance 
of the truth of Shari’a law and the Islamic faith. 
 The external persuader, by contrast, offers arguments based on premises 
that the conjecturer does not herself accept. Instead, she attempts to construct 
an argument from the point of view of a comprehensive conception she does not 
share, in order to persuade her unreasonable interlocutor that, on the basis of 
his view, he should endorse a liberal political morality. As illustration, Wong uses 
the 2015 address of Bernie Sanders to the evangelical Christian institution, 
Liberty University. Whilst declaring his own position as that of a secularized Jew, 
Sanders argued that, from a Christian perspective, income inequality should be 
seen as one of the greatest moral issues of our time, and quoted New Testament 
passages in support of his interpretation of Christian requirements (see Wong 
2018). Similarly, March (2009) provides another version of reasoning by 
conjecture, as a political philosopher who seeks to construct an interpretation of 
Islam conducive to forming an overlapping consensus on liberal political values 
and institutions. 
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 We do not disagree with Wong (or Rawls) that external conjectural 
reasoning might be successful. However, which particular strategy is more likely 
to succeed is an empirical question, the best answer to which is one that is 
appropriately sensitive to various moral, social and political considerations. We 
argue that a division of justificatory labour that emphasizes internal engagement 
is, given those considerations, the optimal strategy. 
 
Conjecture: Between Fact and Perception 
To see why a strategy of internal engagement might be favoured over external 
conjectural reasoning, we might note a number of difficulties that the latter faces, 
but which are not faced – or faced to a lesser extent – by the former. 
 Persuasion by way of conjectural reasoning is a form of conditional 
argument, as we have seen. As Rawls states: ‘we argue from what we believe, or 
conjecture, are other people’s basic doctrines, religious or secular, and try to 
show them that, despite what they might think, they can still endorse a 
reasonable political conception that can provide a basis for public reasons’ 
(Rawls 1999, 594). Our view is that when such conjectural reasons are offered by 
those external to a given religious doctrine, their motives may appear 
disingenuous to those whom they are trying to convince. This may be the case 
because such conjecturers are likely to be viewed as employing such a mode of 
reasoning for instrumental purposes. Or, such conjecturers might be viewed as 
closed-minded – entering the discussion with, say, a pre-conceived liberal-
favouring interpretation of religious scripture. The unreasonable are unlikely to 
be persuaded by those whose motives they view with suspicion. Internal 
persuaders, by contrast, are less likely to encounter such degrees of suspicion on 
these counts.  
 Wong’s view is that an appropriately framed form of conjectural 
reasoning is capable of being both honest and open-minded. Politicians and 
political philosophers who engage in conjecture must meet two jointly-sufficient 
conditions. First, they should disclose their own actual beliefs (including their 
rejection of the beliefs held by the unreasonable) as well as their intentions for 
engaging in conjectural reasoning. This meets the condition for honesty. Second, 
they must be genuinely open to the possibility of revising their own views – even 
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the possibility of abandoning their own reasonable liberal views – in light of 
compelling reasons or evidence as part of that discussion. Not holding one’s 
views dogmatically, but being open to the possibility of change, meets the 
condition of open-mindedness.2 
 Our disagreement with Wong here is not about what would constitute 
conjectural reasoning, properly understood. Anyone who deliberately concealed 
their beliefs or intentions, or who was not open to the possibility of being wrong, 
would be reasoning in bad faith, and not engaged in the enterprise of reasoning 
from conjecture. As political liberals we should want citizens to be supportive of 
liberal political values and institutions for the right reasons, not through sleight 
of hand, or manipulation. However, our original claim is that even if the 
conjecturer is sincere in her enterprise, there is no guarantee that those to whom 
such remarks and arguments are addressed will view them as sincere—we are, 
by hypothesis, in the realm of non-ideal theory. Whilst Wong’s remarks help 
clarify what properties conjectural reasoning, properly understood, must 
contain, it is perfectly possible for someone to satisfy that test, yet still appear 
disingenuous to the person they are trying to persuade. There is a crucial 
distinction, then, between what we might call the fact of disingenuousness and 
the perception that it obtains. From the strategic perspective of trying to 
generate support for liberal political values and institutions for the right reasons, 
it is the latter that is of vital importance. 
 So, even where the reasoner by conjecture is being sincere in the relevant 
sense, her intervention might be taken to be disingenuous by the unreasonable. 
We shall offer four explanations: the perception of bias; the perception of 
arrogance; the perception of insincerity; and, the perception of a lack of 
credibility.  
 
The perception of bias  
Despite giving assurances of honesty and open-mindedness, perceptions of bias 
on the part of conjecturers are likely to remain. Given the fact that the liberal is 
engaging in a deliberate and open attempt to change beliefs, the person who is 
the target of that attempt may well interpret that instrumental aim as clouding 
the judgment of the conjecturer. Even if the conjecturer claims to be open-
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minded and open to having her views changed, the unreasonable might hold the 
epistemic worry that such bias, whether intentional or unintentional, is 
unavoidable (see Schwartzman 2012, 11-12). Where the liberal purports to offer 
an unbiased interpretation of their texts, the unreasonable are simply likely to 
dispute that such an unbiased view is possible. Some Christian apologists who 
enter into public debates with non-believers will, for example, debate the 
existence of a Deity and various scientific and metaphysical claims about the 
nature of the world and Universe, but refuse to debate scriptural or doctrinal 
issues with non-Christians on the basis that their bias prevents them from 
engaging genuinely and sincerely with believers. Similarly, although Wong’s 
example of Bernie Sanders has some of the traction it does so because of the 
doctrinal similarities and historical connectedness of Judaism and Christianity. 
When Sanders reasons from conjecture about what Christians should believe, 
given the articles of their faith, many Christian listeners would likely perceive 
less bias in Sanders than, say, if a Muslim or atheist had attempted a similar 
enterprise.3 Here, we should conclude that the intentions of the speaker are not 
sufficient to allay the charge of disingenuousness. Conversely, an internal 
engager is less likely to suffer from charges of bias on the grounds of arguing 
from grounds they do not accept, or from purely instrumental and biased 
interpretations. Although such charges might be, and no doubt are, leveled 
against co-religionists, the traction of such accusations is less than it is against 
outsiders to the shared faith. 
 
The perception of arrogance  
The second form of perceived insincerity is that of arrogance. When the 
conjecturer offers reasons to the unreasonable for thinking they have 
misunderstood their own faith, the conjecturer runs the risk of being perceived 
as arrogant or conceited, or possessing a sense of superiority. When politicians 
state in public what the true meaning of Christianity or Islam is, they can appear 
crass or rude, as well as condescending, telling those who have spent their lives 
living the experience of being a Christian or Muslim that they know less about 
the proper meaning of their faith than someone with little or no comparative 
experience.  
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The perception of insincerity  
The admission of not sharing the beliefs from which reasoning will begin can, 
itself, reinforce the perception of insincerity. The conjecturer may be perceived 
as holding back on what they really think of the unreasonable person’s beliefs for 
the sake of trying to manufacture some kind of political consensus no matter 
how silly or misguided they do in fact think those beliefs are. Simply adding to 
this some declaration of honesty about what one actually believes of their 
interlocutor’s view may worsen this perception even further. Someone who says, 
for example, ‘I do not share your belief in reason R, and I think there are very 
good reasons and evidence to think R is false, but if I did believe in R, then I 
would see it as supportive of a liberal political morality on account of 
considerations C,’ may meet the criteria for honesty and open-mindedness, but 
may also seem to their interlocutor as lacking even less commitment to the 
worth of the view they are aiming to engage with.  
 
The perception of a lack of credibility  
Relatedly, when those outside a given religion engage in conjectural reasoning, 
they may be viewed as lacking sufficient credibility for their arguments to be 
given any weight or consideration. Perceived disingenuousness in this sense can 
be seen as the conjecturer not having paid her dues in coming to understand and 
appreciate the faith from within; that they are not native to the faith. This lack of 
credibility may have several dimensions to it. First, any external interlocutor or 
conjecturer, however knowledgeable and good her reasoning, may lack 
credibility, because the particular faith-group does not see her intervention as 
having authority. Many religions contain, as a component of their faith, content-
independent reasons for belief, such as deference to de facto intellectual 
authorities. For example, the Pope is considered by those who follow the 
doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church as the inerrant voice of theological and 
moral authority to whom their judgment on certain matters must be 
surrendered. If such de facto authorities provide reasons for belief that are 
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independent of the content of those beliefs, then conjecturing on the basis of 
those beliefs will largely miss the point, and will be very unlikely to succeed at 
persuasion. 
 Second – and questions of deference to authority aside – the views of 
some people receive greater attention, or are given greater weight, than the 
views of others in virtue of their place or role (or lack thereof). For instance, 
some believe that the views of the devout carry more weight than the views of 
those who lack faith or revelation. Where this is the case, the person who 
engages in conjectural reasoning may provide a better or more accurate 
interpretation of religious scripture or requirements, but will still be viewed as 
an interloper who is meddling in issues they really do not understand. Issues of 
standing, like the issue of authority, will turn on reasons for belief that are quite 
independent of the content of those religious beliefs.4  
 These content-independent reasons notwithstanding, there are several 
problems with conjecture on content-dependent grounds. To be credible, the 
conjecturer must surpass some threshold of knowledge or understanding for 
their arguments to carry any weight with the faithful. Ignorant interventions, or 
arguments based on what the believer considers to be simple misconstruals of 
essential points that betoken a lack of understanding or impartiality, are not 
likely to encourage the taking of the conjecturing seriously. When politicians 
pronounce on the correct interpretation of a religious view that they quite 
obviously do not share, they appear disingenuous because of a lack of credibility 
to make such judgments, even if their verdict happens to be correct. 
 As Schwartzman notes, one way to respond to the lack of credibility 
challenge is for the conjecturer to lay out their scholarly credentials 
(Schwartzman 2009, 21). A genuine and concerted effort over an extended 
period of time to learn about a given faith is about as much as anyone external to 
the faith can do to gain such credibility. Such knowledge, if necessary for 
conjecturing is costly to come by, and unlikely to be possessed by politicians and 
political philosophers. Only a few specialists, such as March’s (2009) work on 
Islam and Rawlsian political liberalism, may exist. Even here, however, this may 
not be enough for some who hold unreasonable views. It may be objected by the 
devout that it is impossible to understand their religious view sufficiently 
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without the experience of living as a devout believer oneself. It is sometimes 
claimed, for example, that it is impossible properly to grasp the Islamic faith 
without being able to read the Qu’ran in its Arabic form; reading it in translation 
is insufficient to convey its full and true meaning and import. If this is the view 
held by the unreasonable, then there is little the external conjecturer can do 
other than protest that the threshold is set unreasonably high, and that a view 
that is incapable of being explained to, or learned about to a satisfactory degree, 
by those not raised in it is hardly a suitable basis for the exercise of public 
political power (Schwartzman 2009, 21-22). Moreover, we might wonder, in 
conjectural terms, whether an all-powerful God who deems his message to 
provide such a basis, is incapable of conveying that message in more than one 
language. Notwithstanding these replies, however, many unreasonable citizens 
will be unmoved by them and continue to doubt the credibility of external 
interlocutors. 
 
Weighing the costs 
Such challenges – the perceptions of bias, arrogance, sincerity and credibility – 
are less likely to be faced by those internal to a given religious set of beliefs. 
Many believers will pass the necessary thresholds to have their arguments 
considered. This is not, of course, automatically the case. Much that passes as 
religious debate within a single denomination, such as Protestant Christianity, 
focuses upon the denunciation of the interlocutor as a heretic or false Christian, 
despite an apparent acceptance of the major articles of faith. Sometimes the 
narcissism of small differences can be a greater barrier to persuasion than the 
differences between faiths (see Stevens and O’Hara 2015, ch.4). Our claim is that 
this is less often the case, and that persuasion from within is, given the non-
normative facts in play, more likely to succeed.  
In addition, as we suggested above, it is important to consider the costs of 
persuasion. Even if external reasoning from conjecture could succeed, the 
considerable costs that would have to be incurred to avoid the problems of bias, 
arrogance, sincerity and credibility suggest that the rational choice of a liberal 
community would be to adopt the ‘persuasion begins at home’ division of labour 
we propose. Such a division does not necessarily place all the burdens of 
 11 
conjecture on a particular section of the community. In a multicultural society 
there are very many religious and non-religious communities each of which has 
unreasonable as well as reasonable members. Accordingly, reasonable citizens 
holding different comprehensive conceptions should discharge their duties of 
engagement by engaging with those who share some of their comprehensive 
convictions. In cases in which, because unreasonableness is not evenly 
distributed between comprehensive doctrines, there exists an inequality of the 
burdens of persuasion, measures must be put in place to compensate those who 
take on greater burdens. 
 Finally, we should note that our argument is not that such persuasion is 
only possible from within a particular community or religious tradition: that any 
kind of external attempts, even to persuade members on their own terms, is a 
kind of cultural imposition that brings values and modes of thought and 
interaction alien to that tradition. Reasoning from conjecture, properly 
construed, deliberately refrains from arguing against the fundamental starting 
points, and accepts them for the sake of argument, with the aim of ‘clear[ing] up 
what we take to be a misunderstanding on others’ part, and perhaps equally on 
ours.’ (Rawls 1999, 594). Our objection is not one of principle, but of 
pragmatism. Internal persuasion is more likely to be effective in achieving the 
desired end. This would be fully consistent with affirming external conjectural 
reasoning as the most likely method to succeed in those cases where internal 
persuasion is impossible or counter-productive. Where individuals internal to 
the view might face significant personal costs for engaging in such 
argumentation – perhaps being ostracized, branded as heretics, or worse – or 
where the views of adherents lack a certain authority in such matters – then 
conjectural reasoning may be a better method of proceeding (see Schwartzman 
2009, 19). The kinds of cases we are imagining however – those that are the 
mainstay of disputes in our own democratic societies – are not predominantly of 
this kind. 
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1 See Schwartzman (2012) for a similar distinction between internal and 
external positions (esp. 14-19). 
2 See also Scwartzman’s (2012) discussion of sincerity and disclosure (esp. 9-12). 
3 This may be increasingly the case given a significant movement within 
(particularly American) evangelical Christianity - so called ‘Christian Zionism’ – 
that is supportive of the Jewish state of Israel, and the place of Jews in 
eschatological views, based on certain (Christian) Biblical prophecy. 
4 One form of example of this kind of rejection is listed by renowned Biblical 
scholar Bart D. Erhman, who reports that a familiar reaction among Christian 
adherents to his historical research is one of dismissal on the grounds that 
Erhman himself lacks the necessary faith to be a legitimate authority (Erhman 
2010). 
